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The Evolution of Law: Continued 
Alan Watson 
In my book The Evolution of Law' I sought to give a general theory of 
legal evolution based on detailed legal examples from which generalizations 
could be drawn, offering as few examples as were consistent with my case 
in order to present as clear a picture as possible. I was well aware as I was 
writing that some critics would regard the examples as mere isolated 
aberrations and for them and for other readers who, whether convinced of 
the thesis or not, would like further evidence, I want here to bring forward 
a few extra significant examples. 
I 
In the first chapter I wanted to show that it is, above all, lawyers thinking 
about law, not societal conditions, that determines the shape of legal change 
in developed legal systems. I chose to show as the main example that it was 
the thought pattern of the Roman jurists, rather than conditions in the society 
at large, that determined the origins and nature of the individual Roman 
contracts, and that the jurists were largely unaffected by society's realities. 
Of course, social, economic, political and religious factors, did have an 
impact but to an extent that was very much less than their general 
importance in society. What was true for one main-perhaps the most 
original and the most important-branch of law, developed over centuries 
by jurists in one of the world's most innovative systems, is also true it will 
now be argued, for law in general developed over centuries by judges, in 
another of the world's innovative secular systems, the English medieval 
common law. 
In contrast to my handling of the Roman law of contract I do not want to 
produce a radically new theory of the development of the common law. That 
is why I omitted this example from the book. Rather I want to demonstrate 
that my general thesis is implicit in standard accounts of the growth of the 
common law, especially as exemplified by the best-known modern account, 
Alan Watson is University Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
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1. Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law (Baltimore, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Watson, 
Evolution]. 
Law and History Review 
S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law.2 I would not 
want to accuse Milsom of sharing my viewpoint on legal evolution but, on 
very many pages on individual points and in the picture contained overall in 
his book, his argument strikingly confirms my thesis; assuming, of course, 
he is correct in what he tells us of the history of English law. 
Thus, in discussing feudal tenures-and for long feudal law was at the 
heart of the English legal system-he can say: 'The military tenures, of 
uncertain value as a provision for warfare, brought with them a logic which 
was to generate anachronisms throughout our history.'3 After the Norman 
Conquest, almost all those who held land directly from the King held it by 
knight service which entailed the obligation of providing a fixed number of 
fully armed horsemen for forty days per year. The cavalry was so recruited 
for almost a century - though the military disadvantages of such a system 
are obvious -but eventually money payments called scutage were substi- 
tuted. Though knight service was abolished in 1660 many of the incidents 
of the tenure resulting from its military origins remained until this century.4 
Again, at the low legal level of manor courts and manor law Milsom writes: 
'Some of this law was to perish, some to live to a sad old age as what came 
to be called copyhold.'5 Of the defects of copyhold many have written,6 but 
much of the land of England was held by copyhold until 1925. 'Although 
copyhold now [in the early 17th century] had equal protection, it retained its 
separate identity for three useless centuries, providing a measure of 
economic obstruction, traps for conveyancers, and puzzles for the courts. 
These puzzles concerned such matters as the entailing of copyhold, and they 
were of absorbing legal interest. Today their only value is as an object lesson 
in the great intellectual difficulty a legal system can encounter when it seeks 
to rejoin matters which became separated for reasons which are extinct.'7 On 
the evolution of land ownership he remarks: 'It is hard to say which story is 
the more extraordinary: the evolution of the fee simple as ownership, with 
only its name and its necessary words of limitation to remind us of its 
tenurial beginnings; or the series of seeming accidents which produced the 
fee tail. But this juridical monster, beyond the desires of donors seven 
hundred years ago, beyond the intention of the legislator and far beyond 
2. S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Toronto, 2nd ed., 
1981) [hereinafter cited as Foundations]. 
3. Ibid. at 20. 
4. See e.g. A. W. B. Simpson, Introduction to the History of the Land Law (Oxford, 
1961) 8. 
5. Foundations, supra note 2 at 21. 
6. See e.g. E. H. Burn, Cheshire's Modern Real Property (London, 11th ed., 1982) 24; 
R. E. Megarry and H. W. R. Wade, The Law of Real Property (London, 3rd ed., 1966) 
29; (5th ed., 1984) 32. 
7. Foundations, supra note 2 at 165. 
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reason, is with us yet.'8 'The settlement, by which an owner of property can 
divide the ownership in time between beneficiaries who will take one after 
another, is the most distinctive creation of the common law, and perhaps the 
most unfortunate . . . For the historian the special interest of the 
development is its repeated demonstration of the strength of purely legal 
phenomena. Results were reached which, although absorbed and exploited, 
cannot have been desired.'9 
Examples can also be taken from the law of torts. Milsom points out that 
in the fourteenth century a suit in the royal courts against a blacksmith for 
negligence in shoeing a horse had to allege breach of the king's peace, and 
that this situation was remedied around 1370 when writs were issued which 
did not allege such a breach. 0 But the vi et armis writ for cattle trespass 'had 
been extended to the case of straying animals when wrongs still could not 
come into royal courts unless contra pacem was alleged; and in this case the 
writ was never modified as was the smith's to make an honest action on the 
case. Nor was this a curiosity without consequence: in the twentieth century 
the defendant owner would still be liable without the affirmative showing of 
fault which became necessary in an action on the case.'" And again writing 
of the period before 1370: 'Or consider the sale of a diseased horse 
deceitfully warranted sound. As early as 1307 a buyer had sued in the king's 
court, but again only because he was on the king's service. The ordinary 
plaintiff could hardly represent the wrong as contra pacem: but it might 
seem capricious that he could not get to the king's court when the smith's 
ill-used customer could.'12 Slightly further on: 'Trespass, then, lost its 
original sense by being identified with trespass vi et armis and distinguished 
from case. It was from that distinction that the modern sense of trespass 
grew; and to hindsight the process seems perverse. When contra pacem lost 
its jurisdictional importance about 1370, its importance in the matter of 
process unhappily survived; and a chance of reuniting the law of wrongs was 
missed. A second chance came in 1504, when the same process was 
extended to all trespass actions. Contra pacem was thereafter without 
consequences in the real world except for a nominal fine to the king. But it 
was too late. The two categories existed in lawyers' heads, as the statute 
itself shows. It was certain there was a distinction even if nobody knew what 
it was; and a distinction is never without consequence in a law court.'"3 
Discussing the system of civil judicature as it was around 1300 Milsom 
writes: 'The system was to make some sense until the sixteenth century, to 
last until the nineteenth, and to leave its imprint in every common law 
8. Ibid. at 177. 
9. Ibid. at 166. 
10. Ibid. at 290f. 
11. Ibid. at 291. 
12. Ibid. at 292f. 
13. Ibid. at 308f. 
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jurisdiction today.14 Significantly for us, as we shall see, he adds: 'But it 
was not devised as a national system of civil judicature. It was an 
accumulation of expedients as more and more kinds of disputes were drawn 
first to a jurisdictional and then also to a geographical centre. One result was 
to invest the machinery which controlled jurisdiction with an importance 
that was to outlive and to overshadow its reason.' And on the fact that, in 
general, courts could not act without special authority, namely a writ from 
chancery in each case, he says: 'This jurisdictional accident was to be of 
growing consequence. In the middle ages it hampered the expansion of the 
common law by restricting the kinds of claim that could be brought before 
the court. If ordinary private disputes had continued to come before a 
jurisdiction like that of the eyre, to which plaintiffs had direct access, the 
common law could have reacted directly to changing needs; and in particular 
it could have continued to admit kinds of claims familiar in local courts but 
at first regarded as inappropriate for royal judges. But plaintiffs could not 
get to the court without a chancery writ, and the formulae of the writs, most 
of which were highly practical responses to the needs of thirteenth-century 
litigants, became an authoritative canon which could not easily be altered or 
added to. Important areas, some new but many older than the king's courts 
themselves, were in this way cut off from legal regulation, and they could 
later be reached only by devious ingenuity in the common law courts, or by 
resorting to the chancellor's equitable jurisdiction, to which once more the 
litigant could directly complain .... All this was no more than the 
constriction of red tape. But so complete did it become that in the eighteenth 
century it engendered a purely formalistic view of the law and of its 
development which has lasted until our own day.'15 
Speaking specifically of 'trespass', but his meaning can be generalized, 
Milsom wrote: 'The law itself was seen as based, not upon elementary 
ideas, but upon the common law writs, as consisting in a range of remedies 
which had as it were come down from the skies. If a case fell within the 
scope of one writ, then in general no other writ could be proper.'16 
Many other passages could be cited to the same effect. Whether an action 
was available depended on a system (of writs) which had lost its meaning 
centuries before; whole parts of the law remained in effect though the 
societal structure at their base had disappeared centuries before; the scope of 
a remedy-whether for instance fault was an essential of a particular tort- 
depended and may still depend on devices and dodges invented centuries 
ago to meet difficulties dead centuries ago. Of one distinction, as we have 
seen, Milsom remarks that it 'seems capricious'. So it does, and so does the 
legal result in the other instances quoted; but only if we look at the law from 
society's point of view, from a consideration of the economic and social 
realities. It is not capricious if we look at law from the point of view of the 
14. Ibid. at 33. 
15. Ibid. at 36. 
16. Ibid. at 309. 
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legal elite, in this instance the judges, making the law. 'But practitioners and 
judges do not normally give a pin for legal development. Their duty is to 
these clients and the proper disposition of this case', says Milsom.'7 
Precisely. Judges cannot dispose of a case just as they wish. They are boxed 
in, especially in a system based on precedent, by former decisions whether 
relating to jurisdiction or to points of substantive law. Writing specifically 
of land settlements Milsom declares: 'The rules under which so much of the 
wealth of England was held for so much of its history were made and 
unmade by these processes, so extraordinary when looked at as a whole and 
backwards, so reasonable step by forward step.'18 In the attempt to give a 
decent remedy in a particular situation the judges may make matters worse 
both by complicating the law and by directing its course for the future.19 In 
judge-made law, the input of society at large-both in terms of the views of 
the inhabitants and of economic interests-is different from what it is in 
jurist-made law. At the very least the case comes before the judge only 
because there is a problem, and the issues are put vehemently-as 
vehemently at least as the system allows-by the interested party. But 
society's input is not matched by the outcome. That is determined by the 
judges' view of the law. It cannot surprise that there are rules of judging, 
that judges are blinkered by law that they see as existing in its own right, 
even if they can at times twist it to a rather different shape. If there is any 
cause for surprise it is-as with the Roman law of contract-the acquies- 
cence in this type of legal evolution by the ruling elite and society at large. 
But, then, if there was not this acquiescence most of the time, law would not 
evolve as largely autonomous, involved with its own culture, in the way that 
I claim. 
The nature of legal evolution in England by judicial precedent leads to a 
fundamental question (which will not be answered here). Because of its 
emphasis on development by precedent and in ignoring Roman law, English 
law came eventually to be unique in Western Europe with different legal 
rules, divisions of law, legal structures, systematization, and hierarchies of 
law-makers. What does this tell one about society in general and the ruling 
elite? Was England really different in social structure and values from the 
rest of Europe? And if it was, what were the significant social differences? 
Saxony, for example, taking the other route of building upon the Corpus 
Juris Civilis, was by the middle of the nineteenth century the possessor of 
a much more sophisticated, systematic, analytical system of law than 
England then had. Does this tell one anything except about law? I doubt that 
it does until someone documents the differences in the societies that account 
for the difference in legal approach. What is one to make of the fact that for 
a long time, from 1714 until the death of King William IV in 1837, the king 
of England was the king of Hannover in Germany where a very different 
17. Ibid. at 77. 
18. Ibid. at 199. 
19. For a particular example see Watson, Evolution, supra note 1 at 35ff. 
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legal system prevailed? Even then Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, 
became King of Hannover and reigned until 1851. And was England, by 
avoiding the Reception of Roman law, more innovative in law than were the 
other Western European states? If it was, what meaning does this have? 
Law has, as Martin Kriegier emphasizes, a 'pervasive traditionality', that 
to a considerable extent the legal past is a normatively and authoritatively 
significant part of the legal present.20 As he puts it, 'In every complex 
tradition, such as law, what is present at any particular time is the currently 
authoritative or persuasive residue of deposits made over generations, 
recording and transmitting inconsistent and often competing values, beliefs 
and views of the world. Current law is full of elements caught in and 
transmitted by legal tradition over generations. Dig into this diachronic 
quarry at any particular time, and the present will be a revealing mixture of 
fossils, innovations of the long gone, and recent deposits.' This incoherence 
is very obvious, as we have seen, in a system such as that of England built 
up by judicial precedent. It also appears with astonishing clarity in a federal 
country where neighboring provinces or states, having much in common, 
build up over centuries very different legal rules on matters of fundamental 
concern. The law of the Swiss cantons at the time of the preparation of the 
Swiss Civil Code, Schweizerisches Gesetzbuch (ZGB), is a good example. 
Virgile Rossel (who prepared the French translation) was one of the two 
rapporteurs for the French language at the debate of the Conseil National in 
1905 on the draft code of Eugen Huber, and he emphasised that the 
differences existing between the cantonal laws then in force had, almost 
always, origins that could not be explained by religion, language or even by 
race. Then he continued: 
What is, for example, the matrimonial regime that is the nearest to that of the canton of 
Neuchatel? Do not search too close by: go, on the contrary, to the extreme eastern 
frontier of Switzerland, in the canton of the Grisons! Perhaps you think that the 
matrimonial regime of the canton of Thurgau and even the whole economy of its civil 
legislations is strongly attached to the neighboring canton of Zurich? The analogies are 
much more striking between the code of Thurgau and the code Napoleon than between 
the same code of Thurgau and that which Bluntschli drew up. Gentlemen, I borrow 
some other perceptions, no less characteristic, from the message of the federal council 
of 24 November 1896: 
'The cantonal law gives the advantage to the sons to the detriment of daughters in the 
cantons of Lucerne, Fribourg, Zug and Thurgau. Schaffhausen and Neuchatel give to 
ascendants and collaterals the right of property return according to the origin of the 
goods. Appenzell, Argau, Basel, Fribourg and Solothurn make no distinction between 
the paternal and the maternal lines. Geneva, Thurgau, the Bernese Jura, Sankt Gallen, 
Vaud, Fribourg, Ticino and Solothurn make of ascendants a special class of heirs. 
Fideicommissary substitutions are forbidden in Geneva, the Bernese Jura, Lucerne, 
Glaris, in the Grisons and in Zug. Geneva, the Bernese Jura, Neuchatel, Appenzell, 
Aargau, Valais, Bern, Vaud, Glaris and Fribourg give the illegitimate child a share in 
the inheritance to his father. Zurich, Geneva, Thurgau, Soleure, Ticino, Neuchatel, 
Sankt Gallen and the Bernese Jura have permitted adoption. Bern, Thurgau, Aargau, 
20. M. Krygier, 'Critical Legal Studies and Social Theory: A Response to Alan Hunt', 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987) 26. 
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Geneva, Soleure, Neuchatel, Fribourg and Ticino give the mother, on the father's death, 
the paternal power and the guardianship of the children. Geneva and Nidwalden have 
instituted the family council whose task is to look after the tutor's administration. In the 
realm of the law of property, we find a land registry in Basel-city, Soleure, in the canton 
of Vaud, in Schwytz and Nidwalden . . .' I cut short my quotation. But is that not the 
best demonstration of what is artificial and fortuitous in our Swiss law? This mosaic, 
which seems the result of fantasy and chance at least as much as of ethical or moral 
influences, ought not to fill us with such veneration that we do not dare to lay hands on 
it.21 
(Here we are concerned with the fact of the incoherence of legal rules in 
neighboring cantons or states in a federal nation, not with explaining the 
causes of the differences. But investigation would show that many of the 
differences had their origins in particular events which were not deeply 
rooted in local consciousness. An individual dispute might require court 
resolution. And the court's decision might be followed in subsequent cases 
as being the best evidence of local custom, whether or not any local custom 
existed. A similar neighboring state might reach a contrary decision, 
possibly for reasons inhering in the particular case, and that decision in time 
21. Amtliches Stenographisches Bulletin der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung, 
Nationalrat (1905) 436. 
Quel est, par exemple, le r6gime matrimonial qui se rapproche le plus de celui du 
canton de Neuchatel? Ne cherchez pas trop pres; allez au contraire a l'extreme 
frontiere orientale de la Suisse, dans le canton des Grisons! Vous pensez peut-etre 
que le regime matrimonial du canton de Thurgovie et meme toute l'6conomie de 
sa legislation civile le rattachent 6troitement au canton voisin de Zurich? Les 
analogies sont beaucoup plus frappantes entre le code thurgovien et le code 
Napoleon, qu'entre le meme code thurgovien et celui qu'a redig6 Bluntschli. 
J'emprunte, Messieurs, au message du conseil federal du 24 novembre 1896 
quelques autres constatations non moins caract6ristiques: 
'Le droit des cantons avantage les fils au ddtriment des filles dans les cantons de 
Lucerne, Fribourg, Zoug et Thurgovie. Schaffhouse et Neuchatel donnent aux 
ascendants et collat6raux le droit de retour selon l'origine des biens. Appenzell, 
Argovie, Bale, Fribourg, Soleure ne font aucune distinction entre les lignes 
paternelle et maternelle. Geneve, Thurgovie, le Jura bernois, Saint-Gall, Vaud, 
Fribourg, Tessin et Soleure font des ascendants une classe speciale d'heritiers. Les 
substitutions fiddicommissaires sont interdites a Geneve, dans le Jura bernois, a 
Lucerne, Glaris, dans les Grisons et a Zoug. Geneve le Jura bernois, Neuchatel, 
Appenzell, Argovie, le Valais, Berne, Vaud, Glaris et Fribourg accordent a 
l'enfant naturel une part dans la succession de son pere. Zurich, Geneve 
Thurgovie, Soleure, Tessin, Neuchatel, St-Gall et le Jura bernois ont admis 
l'adoption. Berne, Thurgovie, Argovie, Geneve, Soleure, Neuchatel, Fribourg et 
le Tessin donnent a ; le mere, au deces du pere la puissance paternelle et la tutelle 
des enfants. Gen6ve et Nidwald ont institu6 le conseil de famille, qui a pour 
mission de surveiller la gestion du tuteur. Dans le domaine du droit des choses, 
nous trouvons le registre foncier a Bale-ville, Soleure, dans le canton de Vaud a 
Schwytz et a Nidwald.' . . . J'abrege ma citation. Mais n'est-elle pas la meilleure 
demonstration de ce qu'il y a eu d'artificiel et de fortuit dans la formation de notre 
droit suisse? Cette mosaique, qui semble le r6sultat de la fantaisie et du hasard pour 
le moins autant que des influences 6thiques ou morales, ne doit pas nous remplir 
d'une v6n6ration telle que nous n'osions pas y toucher. 
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might be treated as the basis of local custom. Or at the time of the 
codification of cantonal law a new rule might be adopted without much 
thought from an outside code, whether of a different canton or of a foreign 
state like France which at the time had general prestige. And, once accepted 
for whatever reason, a rule lives on.)22 
As the example of England also makes abundantly plain, legal develop- 
ment is greatly affected by the sources of law that are available. And here 
I want to point out one aspect of development by juristic opinion that has been 
understressed, namely the ability and power of jurists to react against the 
existing tradition and in part create a new one. They are, of course, still bound 
by what they know, but jurists can attempt to reject much of what has gone 
before. Much more freely than judges, they can decide whom they wish to 
regard as authoritative and whom they will despise. They do not have to give 
a ruling that will be acceptable in a particular case and, to be effective, they 
need not cause a change in accepted dogma or methodology at once. They 
can have long term aims. The prime example of jurists adopting a new 
influential approach must be that of the great Humanists of the Renaissance, 
such as Cuiacius and Donellus, with the rejection of the methodology of the 
Glossators, Post-Glossators and, above all, of the Bartolists. To assess the 
extent of their impact would require volumes but that need not detain us 
here.23 What needs to be emphasized is only that jurists can powerfully affect 
the tradition. In this regard, naturally, the Humanists do not stand alone. 
One other example of the power of jurists is significant. It comes from the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and more particularly from Naples, from the 
late seventeenth well into the eighteenth century.24 There was a change in 
attitude among the law professors, away from the traditional authorities to 
other international figures. Their works contain references to philosophers 
such as Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Descartes, as well as to 
jurists such as Cuiacius, Donellus, Hotman, Brissonius, Bynkershoek, 
Pufendorf, Stryk and Grotius.25 The Praelectiones ad Institutiones 
22. For demonstration of such developments in particular cases see e.g. Watson, Evolution, 
supra note 1 at 28ff, 43ff (and especially at 58f). 
23. But I have argued elsewhere that the Humanists, by showing that to a great extent the 
Corpus Juris Civilis was not of classical origin, weakened its authority and thus 
academics could more respectably pay attention to other aspects of local law. This was 
an important factor in the codification of civil law systems. See A. Watson, The Making 
of the Civil Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1981) 71f. There are implications for 'schools' of 
jurists in D. Osler, 'A Star is Born', 2 Rechtshistorisches Journal (1983) 194f. 
24. See G. Manna, Della Giurisprudenza e del Foro Napoletano della sua Originefino alla 
Pubblicazione delle nuove Leggi (Naples, 1859) 186f. 
25. Examples of such book are F. Rapolla, De jure regni neapolitani Commentaria in 
ordine redacta (Naples, 1746); C. Fimiami, Elementa juris privati neapolitani in duos 
libros redacta (Naples, 1782); M. Guarani, Syntagma romani juris ac patrii secundum 
seriem Institutionum Imperialium (Naples, 1773); G. Maffei, Institutiones juris civilis 
Neapolitanorum (Naples, 1784); G. Basta, Institutiones juris romani neapolitani 
(Naples, 1782); 0. Fighera, Institutiones juris regni neapolitani (Naples, 1782). 
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Justiniani (1779) of M. Guarani may serve as one particular instance. The 
book contains, among legal citations, references to local case law and 
statute. Of references to foreign authors I made the following count: Noodt 
30; Bynkershoek 22; Grotius 20; Stryk 19; J. Gothofredus 17; Vinnius 16; 
Cujacius and Donellus 15 each; Heineccius 14; U. Huber 11; Pufendorf 10; 
and fewer than 10 to many others. To Italian writers I find: Doctores 12 and 
Glossa 3; Baldus 5; Bartolus 4; Irnerius, Accursius and Julius Clarus 1 each. 
Astonishingly, given the Spanish connection, I find to Spanish jurists only 
two references to Gomes and one to Covarruvias; and more surprisingly 
still, none at all to the famous Neapolitan De Lucca. This rate of citation 
seems very lopsided. This new approach was slow to have an impact but was 
eventually powerfully felt as can be seen from the writings from the most 
important writer on the practice of the time, the advocate Giuseppe Sorge.26 
This Neapolitan phenomenon is quite typical of what happens when 
jurists wish to change the existing tradition. To begin with, works which 
previously were treated as authoritative are either not cited or are cited only 
to be summarily dismissed; in either eventuality the opinions contained in 
them are not properly considered. Then some other jurists are continually 
cited, to an extent that to an outsider seems extreme-it still seems 
astonishing that the Neapolitan Guarani cites the Dutchman Gerhardt Noodt 
more often than anyone else (apart from himself), and that he cites ten 
'foreigners' each more often than ten times and no Italian (other than 
reporters of cases) more often than five times. Finally, it should be noted 
that it takes time for their approach to have a practical impact.27 
II 
It is usually said that custom becomes law (in a system which has regard 
for customary law) when people obey certain norms in the belief that they 
are the law. I argued in the second chapter of The Evolution of Law that (in 
such a system) so-called customary law is declared by judicial decision 
(even where in general precedent has no binding force) and becomes law 
thereby whether there was or was not an existing custom, whether if there 
26. See Giuseppe Sorge, Jurisprudentia forensis universi juris materias, 11 vols. (Naples, 
1740-44); Giuseppe Sorge, Enucleationes casuum forensium, sive additamenta ad 
opus jurisprudentiae forensis, 11 vols. (Naples 1756-58). 
27. An example closer to home, and equally typical of development by juristic interpre- 
tation, is provided by the group in the contemporary U.S. known as Critical Legal 
Studies scholars. They, too, attempt to reject much of what has gone before, though 
they are bound by what they know. A glance at the footnotes in their writings will 
quickly reveal whom they wish to regard as authoritative-references to Roberto Unger 
and Duncan Kennedy are de rigueur-and whom they will despise. Indeed, some 
writings of the masters are always, in all contexts, treated as of the greatest relevance. 
A true believer reveals his faith by referring to these writings favorably in the opening 
pages of his own piece. For the group see the bibliography of Critical Legal Studies by 
Alan Hunt in 47 Modern Law Review 369ff (1984). 
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was one the judge followed it, and that frequently the rules of so-called 
customary law are borrowed from elsewhere. Customary law derives its 
validity from official recognition, I claimed, not from past popular 
behavior. 
In some instances the traditional view is clearly wrong. 'Fueros' is the 
name given in Spain to collections of local municipal law, often containing 
particular privileges. These are usually classed as short ('breves') or 
extended ('extensos'). The majority of the former date from the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, the majority of the latter a little later. It is a peculiarity of 
the fueros that the most successful were, totally or partially, granted to or 
borrowed by other municipalities. The main outlines of the transfer of fueros 
from town to town are well-known; in fact Ana Maria Barrero Garcia in her 
Fuero de Teruel publishes a map with arrows showing the direction, and 
dates indicating the time, of movement of fueros from municipality to 
municipality.28 So long as fueros are regarded as containing customary law, 
it is hard to see how their movement can be regarded as consistent with the 
traditional notion that customary law emerges from norms people obey in 
the belief that they are law. Yet F. Tomas y Valiente, the most highly 
regarded of the younger generation of Spanish legal historians, writes: 
'Because they contain the customary law, alive in that place; because they 
are in part the fruit of the municipal autonomy and at the same time its 
guarantee, given that they contain the privileges on which this autonomy is 
based and the rules for the choice by the locals of judges and town officials; 
and because of the complete and self-sufficient nature of the order contained 
in them, the municipal fueros were considered by the towns and cities as 
their own property and very important, and accordingly were defended 
against other types of law (that of the king and that of the learned jurists 
because, as we shall see, both began to develop in the 13th century).'29 With 
no apparent awareness that he is contradicting his first clause, his next 
sentences run: 'Just as happened with short fueros, the extended fuero of one 
town was often enough granted directly to another. At times the redactors of 
the fuero of one city utilized as a model the already written text of the law 
of another.' The rest of his first passage just quoted is more convincing for 
the importance attributed to fueros. Inhabitants defended their fuero because 
it granted them privileges; not because it contained the good old norms 
derived from their habitual behavior. 
Nor was this movement of municipal customary law from town to town 
confined to Spain. It occurred frequently elsewhere; in Normandy for 
example. Thus, Eu borrowed the privileges of Saint Quentin, at Les Andelys 
the rules were copied from those of Mantes, and in general the rules of 
Norman towns derived from those of Rouen.30 
28. Ana Maria Barrero Garcia, Fuero de Teruel (Madrid, 1979) 7. 
29. F. Tomas y Valiente, Manual de Historia del derecho Espanol (Madrid, 4th ed., 1983) 
150. 
30. See, e.g., R. Besnier, La Coutume de Normandie, histoire externe (Paris, 1935) 32 
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There is another problem with the traditional view: the spatial limits of 
customary law coincide with the political frontiers. Robert Besnier, writing 
of the Coutume of Normandy, puts it this way: 'The political framework 
becomes fixed at the moment when the necessity of a coutume imposes itself 
upon the Normans. Hence comes the parallelism between the creation of the 
institutions and the elaboration of the law. The limits of the dukedom and 
the jurisdiction of the custom coincide: the latter is essentially fixed by the 
repetition of identical acts in similar situations, it develops everywhere, 
simultaneously, as well in the courts of justice as in daily relations or in the 
presence of officers charged with administrative, military or financial 
matters. At a time when functions are not yet clearly specialized there are no 
organisms which do not play their role in this slow elaboration.'31 This 
spatial coincidence is more easily explained, as I argued on other grounds, 
if one says that where customary law is recognised it is created only when 
it is officially recognised or accepted, and this recognition is signalled by 
court decisions. Court jurisdictions and political boundaries then necessarily 
coincide. 
I also argued that a difficulty for believing that customary law rested on 
a general conviction that it was law was that often the custom was difficult 
to find even when it could be said that there was something that could be 
designated as the custom. A striking instance of the difficulty of knowing 
the custom even when there was one is given by the Coutume de Toulouse. 
This was written down in the 'livre blanc' which was kept in the town hall, 
but it was written in Latin! Cazaveteri published an edition in 1545 with 
short notes but still in Latin. Frangois-Frangois in 1615 published selected 
titles with commentary, this time in French, but the work contained less than 
half of the Coutume. In the eighteenth century very few copies of these (long 
out-of-print) books were to be found in lawyers' offices or at booksellers. 
Only at the very end of the 18th century was the whole Coutume translated 
into French and published by Soulatges with the express intention of making 
it accessible to lawyers and others.32 
Toulouse was by no means the only place whose custom was written in 
Latin; the same occurred elsewhere, for instance in Spain. Thus, the 
customs of Lerida which were the first redaction of local laws in Catalonia 
were written in Latin in 1228 by Guillermo Botet. Subsequently they were 
turned into Catalan but significantly that version has not survived though 
there are five manuscripts of the Latin.33 And if one accepts, as I think one 
[hereinafter cited as Coutume]. If, as often the privileges of one town were granted to 
another by the ruler then the result is statute, not customary law. Nonetheless, as with 
the redaction of coutumes in France in general, the written redaction was regarded in 
fact as containing customary law. 
31. Ibid. at 22. 
32. Soulatges, La Coutume de Toulouse (Toulouse) ix. The work is not dated, but the latest 
reference is to 10 November, 1769. 
33. See P. Loscertales de Valdeavellano, Costumbres de Lerida (Barcelona, 1946) lOff. 
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should, that fueros ought to be regarded in part as containing customary law 
then one should include as customs written in Latin those of, for instance in 
Extremadura, Calatayud (1131), Daroca (1142), Teruel (1177) and Cuenca 
(1188 or slightly thereafter). 
Of course, often in a customary system law is needed where there is no 
law or, if there is, it cannot be found. The law has to be created. To give one 
further example: King Liutprand of the Lombards in several years of his 
reign issued a number of laws. In some of the preambles he expressly states 
that the laws that follow are enacted precisely because the custom is not 
known or, if it is, is not wanted by persons other than him. Thus, for his 
thirteenth year (725 A.D.): 'Because I remembered that subjects of ours 
coming into our presence brought causes in controversy among themselves 
which we were not certain how to bring to an end according to custom nor 
were provided for in the body of the Edict.'34 The Lombards were fortunate 
that theirs was a society with statutory law as well as custom; otherwise a 
custom would just have been imagined to exist. 
Also, as I maintained, the whole notion of customary law being what 
people do is undermined by the usual approach in medieval and later France 
of accepting the law of somewhere else, usually of Rome as the law was set 
out in the Corpus Juris Civilis or of Paris as the law was to be found in the 
Coutume de Paris, as subsidiary law when the local coutume failed to give 
the answer. Whichever was chosen, conditions in early Byzantium or the 
capital of France were very different from those, say, in parts of Brittany or 
the Auvergne. And there is no doubt that gaps often had to be filled in the 
local coutume. But what is the standard doctrine of customary law to make 
of the fact that just before the French Revolution (which was to put an end 
to local custom) it could still be questioned in general whether recourse was 
to be had to the Corpus Juris Civilis or the Coutume de Paris?35 In circum- 
stances such as these one cannot even say that in the absence of a custom it 
was the custom to look at the custom or other law of some other particular 
place! 
Apart from any other considerations, there is one reason that I should like 
to mention that will make it very difficult for my thesis on the nature of 
customary law to become acceptable. The reason is very practical. No society 
that accepts a system of customary law can operate it on the open basis that 
I postulate. The law would lack authority. Such societies operate in law by 
a myth. In general they have no legislation, do not accept judicial decisions 
as binding precedent, either have no law books or do not see them as 
authoritative. How then do they resolve disputes? The legitimate answer for 
those living under such systems can only be that they look for the norms of 
34. 'Dum memorassem quod venientes homines nostri, in praesentiam nostram, adduxerint 
caussas, inter se altercantes quae nec per usum fuimus certi ad terminandum, nec in 
Edicti corpore anteriori incerto.' See also for slightly different issues the preambles 
from his fourteenth (726 A.D.) and fifteenth (727 A.D.) years. 
35. See., e.g., Soulatges, La Coutume de Toulouse, supra note 32 at xiff. 
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practical behavior that are generally regarded by the populace as binding. 
There cannot be open recognition that there may not be a custom, that a rule 
may be accepted as law simply because it exists elsewhere, or that a judge 
is just making up a rule. But a myth to live by is to the outsider no less a myth. 
To illustrate the preceding paragraph we can turn again to the Costumbres 
de Lerida. Botet lists at the beginning of the work the sources of law in 
Lerida and he includes mores, customary behavior. But he says he was 
urged by his fellow consuls and other citizens to write down the custom and 
he explains in the opening paragraph why he did so: 'I Guillermo Botet have 
put in some little effort in order to collect in one place and set out in writing 
the various and different customs of our city in order to take away the 
opportunity of evil-doing from some people who declare, when a custom is 
in their favor, that it is the custom. If it is alleged against them in a similar 
case they insist that it is not the custom. Hence, proof of customs delays the 
progress of law suits and thus litigants incur severe costs.'36 If the difficulty 
of finding and knowing the custom can plausibly be given by Botet as his 
reason for writing down the customs then in fact he incidentally gives the lie 
to the notion that customary law arises from normative behavior which 
occurs because people believe it is the law. Yet, as we have seen, Botet 
himself says that in this connection it is the mores which are law. He also 
tells us in paragraphs 168 and 169 that among the sources of law ranking 
after customs are inter alia Visigothic law then Roman law. Visigothic law 
is seldom followed, he says, but Roman law often is especially in matters 
which do not arise every day. In effect he is saying that in the absence of 
custom, custom assumes that Roman law will be assumed to be the custom. 
There is no other basis for accepting that Roman law is authoritative. 
Equally significantly, the fuero of Cuenca-as do many other collections 
of customs-gives as the justification for their redaction into writing: 
'Because therefore human memory is transient.' Again, if customs cannot 
be remembered they cannot be obeyed because of a consciousness that they 
are law.37 Even if the transience of memory is not a reason for the redaction 
of custom it is significant that it is given. 
36. 'Ego Guillelmus Botetus dedi aliquantulam operam ut consuetudines ciuitatis uarias et 
diuersas in unum colligerem et scriptis comprehenderem ut aufferretur quibusdam 
occasio malignandi qui quando erat pro eis consuetudo et esse consuetudinem 
affirmabant. Si contra eos in consimili casu allegabatur non esse consuetudinem 
asserebant. Unde processus causarum probacio consuetudinis retardabat et litigantes 
inde dispendia grauia senciebant.' 
37. 'Quoniam igitur humana labilis est memoria nec rerum turbe potest sufficere ob hoc 
cautele sagaci actum est arbitrio leges autentice institutionis et iura civica, que 
consulta discretione ad sedendam seditionem inter cives [et incolas] de regali 
auctoritate manarunt, litterarum apicibus anotari, ut majori, quia regali tuicione 
munitas, malignantium versucia nullatenus possint infringi, vel alicuius subreptioris 
molestia deinceps eneruari;' to be found in R. de Urefia, Fuero de Cuenca (Madrid, 
1935) 111. Of course, since the compilation is official it has become statute and the 
fuero does contain legislative materials but that does not affect the issue. 
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III 
In the third chapter of The Evolution of Law I sought to explain what 
happens when legal systems of very different levels of sophistication come 
into powerful contact. Above all I wanted to show that the Reception of 
Roman law in Western Europe, far from being one of the most difficult 
problems of history, corresponds to cultural patterns of development. A 
mature legal system in writing can easily be used as a quarry even by 
societies with very different economic and social structures. Each society 
takes what it wants, when it wants, and there is no great desire to search for 
the most appropriate rule. Who in particular does the taking and who in 
particular does not want to search too far is obvious: the law making elite. 
The developed system in writing is above all accessible, with rules that can 
be used to fill gaps in the other systems. Such a Reception presents difficult 
problems only for those-and they are many-who believe that there is a 
very close correlation between the law of a society and the life of the 
society. 
I did not go beyond explaining the Reception of Roman law. That great 
example illumines others. But it is worth examining one modern phenom- 
enon to show that it, too, corresponds in great measure to the pattern. The 
phenomenon I mention is the taking over in whole or in large part of a 
modern western code by a 'third world country' with the specific aim of 
modernization. 
The example I wish to discuss is Turkey which in 1926 took into its civil 
code virtually all of the two Swiss codes, the Schweizerisches Gesetzbuch 
and the Obligationenrecht. Turkey in the same year promulgated its 
commercial code which was a compilation of at least a dozen foreign 
statutes, and issued in 1929 its code of the sea which is a translation of book 
four of the German commercial code (Handelsgesetzbuch). 
The Turkish Minister of Justice of the time, Mahmut Esad Bozkurt, on the 
occasion of the Festschrift of the Istanbul Law Faculty to mark the civil 
code's fifteenth birthday, explained the reasons for the codification. The 
first was that the Turkish legal system was backward and primitive. Three 
kinds of religious law were in force, Islamic, Christian and Jewish, each 
with its appropriate court. Only a kind of law of obligations, the 'Mecelle', 
and real property law was common to all. The second was that the 
recognition of such an odd system of justice, namely that three kinds of law 
applied through three kinds of courts, could not correspond to the modern 
understanding of the state and its unity. The third and most important was 
that each time Turkey had demanded the removal of the capitulation terms 
of the First World War by the victorious Allies, the latter refused, pointing 
to the backward state of the Turkish legal system and its connection with 
religion. When as a result of the Lausanne Peace Treaty the capitulation 
terms were removed, the Turks took it upon themselves to form a completely 
new Turkish organization of justice with a new legal system, new laws and 
new courts. Bozkurt said that in one word the system was to be 'Worldly'. 
The duties undertaken by the Turks under the Lausanne Treaty had to be 
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accomplished as quickly as possible. During the First World War commis- 
sions were already set up in Istanbul to prepare laws and they had started 
work. The results were examined in 1924. After seven or eight years there 
were only completed 200 articles on a law of obligations, the sections on 
succession, guardianship, formation of marriage and divorce of a civil code, 
of a criminal code between seventy and eighty articles, and even the code of 
land transactions was only a torso.38 Consequently after various systems 
were looked at, the two Swiss codes were virtually adopted in their entirety. 
Though the motivation was different from most earlier receptions-drastic 
modernization of society rather than the filling of gaps in the law-the 
Turkish reception was otherwise similar. The creation of new autochthonous 
law is difficult, it is much easier to borrow from an already existing, more 
sophisticated system which can be used as a model, above all where the donor 
system is accessible in writing. By this time, of course, there were various 
excellent codes which could have provided a model, notably the French, 
German and Swiss all of which were greatly admired. Why was Swiss law 
chosen? Various answers have been given but three strike me as most 
important; the Swiss laws were the most modern;39 Switzerland had been 
neutral during the War whereas French law was that of a former enemy and 
German law was that of a defeated ally; and Bozkurt had studied law in 
Switzerland, so Swiss law was most familiar to him. Hirsch, a German 
scholar who was a professor of commercial law at Istanbul and Ankara 
between 1933 and 1952 emphasizes the-to him, overriding-importance of 
the last factor.40 In any event, there is no reason to think that somehow Swiss 
law was more adapted than were French or German law to the society that 
Turkey wanted to become. 
Hirsch stresses the nature of such a reception. What is imported, he 
insists, is neither foreign law nor foreign codes, but foreign cultural property 
which only after its linguistic and systematic transformation finds the 
appropriate external form, and only in the act of legislation is it fixed as a 
binding legal rule and comes into force.41 Even after such legislation a 
reception is not a once and for all act, but a social process extending over 
many years. The result will not be Swiss law in Turkey, but Turkish law that 
owes much to Swiss legal culture, concepts and rules. 
To continue with Turkey as an example. Some Swiss rules will not be 
accepted at all and others will be changed. For instance, the legal regime in 
Switzerland for spouses' property is community property (ZGB 178), in 
38. Bozkurt is quoted (in German) in E. E. Hirsch, Rezeption als sozialer Prozess (Berlin, 
1981) 33f [hereinafter cited as Hirsch, Rezeption]. 
39. See e.g. H. V. Velideoglu, 'Erfahrungen mit dem Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch 
in der Turkei', Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht [hereinafter cited as ZSR] 81 
(1962) 51ff at 53 . 
40. Hirsch, 'Die Einflusse und Wirkungen auslandischen Rechts auf das heutige Tiirkische 
Recht', Zeitschrift fur das gesamte Handelsrecht 116 (1954) 201ff at 206. 
41. Hirsch, Rezeption, supra note 38 at llf. 
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Turkey it is separate property (Turkish Civil Code 170); the surviving 
spouse's right to a usufruct is smaller in Turkey (TCC 444 ?2) than in 
Switzerland (ZGB 462 ?2); the judicial separation of spouses may in 
Switzerland be pronounced for an indefinite time (ZGB 147 ?1) but not 
in Turkey (TCC 139 ? 1); desertion as a ground of divorce must in the former 
country have lasted at least two years (ZGB 140), in the latter at least three 
months (TCC 132); the minimum age for marriage in the former is for males 
twenty, for females eighteen (exceptionally eighteen and seventeen,) in the 
latter for males eighteen, for females seventeen. Other rules will be 
accidentally mistranslated and the final result need not be that of the donor 
nation. Others will be deliberately given a different value in the translation. 
Still others will remain a dead letter because they have no counterpart in 
Turkish conditions. The Turkish courts in giving flesh to the rules through 
interpretation may, as they usually but not always have done, follow the 
interpretation of the Swiss courts. Again, many rules will have a different 
societal value in the two countries, such as those on a minimum age for 
marriage or on the requirements for a divorce.42 Finally such a reception, as 
fast as Atatiirk wanted it to be, will, like that of Roman law and of other 
systems, be a slow process, and the speed and the extent of its success- 
never complete-will vary with circumstances. 
A little more must be said on this last point. To begin with, any new law 
resulting from such a massive transplantation has to be learned by judges 
and lawyers as well as by the people before it becomes effective. In the case 
of Turkey, where the new legal system was so different from what had gone 
before but was so closely attached to European models, the solution was to 
import foreign professors from Germany and Switzerland, notably Andreas 
B. Schwartz and Ernst E. Hirsch, to teach the new law and to send budding 
lawyers and law professors to study law in Europe.43 Secondly, aspects of 
traditional social life, such as marriage, will respond only slowly to the 
pressures of new law especially in country districts. Significantly, essays in 
a collection44 published to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Turkish 
codification stress the extent to which the reception had not 'taken' whereas 
those in another collection to mark the fiftieth anniversary accept the 
reception but emphasize its continuing nature and the fact that is not, nor 
will be, complete.45 In 1956, Kurt Lipstein could describe the consequences 
of compulsory civil marriage as 'disappointing, to say the least'.46 In 1978, 
June Starr reported that, in a particular village which she had studied, she 
42. See e.g. Hirsch, Rezeption, supra note 38; M. Zwahlen, 'L'Application en Turquie du 
Code civil recu de la Suisse', ZSR 95 (1976), 249ff. 
43. See Hirsch, Rezeption, supra note 38 at 56f. 
44. Annales de la Faculte de Droit d'Istanbul 5 (1956) [hereinafter cited as AFDI]. 
45. Fiinfzig Jahre Tiirkisches Zivilgesetzbuch, ZSR 95 (1976), 217ff. 
46. Kurt Lipstein, 'The Reception of Western Law in Turkey', AFDI, supra note 44 at 6, 
3ffat 18. 
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found little evidence 'that villagers are lax in obtaining state marriage 
licenses' .47 
The success or partial, yet still growing, success of the transplanting of 
Swiss legal ideas into Turkey gives many insights into what happens when 
a less 'modern' or less 'developed' system comes into powerful contact with 
a sophisticated modern system. These insights become almost blinding 
when we recall that Eugen Huber who virtually alone was responsible for the 
ZGB said that 'The law must be delivered in speech out of the thought of the 
people. The reasonable man who reads it, who has pondered the age and its 
needs, must have the perception that the law was delivered to him in speech 
from the heart.' ('Das Gesetz muss aus den Gedanken des Volkes heraus 
gesprochen sein. Der verstandige Mann, der es liest, muss die Empfindung 
haben, das Gesetz sei ihm vom Herzen gesprochen.' )48 And Virgile Rossel, 
declared 'In particular if one could say of the code Napoleon that it was 
'written reason' we intended to work according to the sense of the national 
spirit, raising the moral level of our law so far as possible, and we would be 
happy if it was said one day of the Swiss civil code that it is, to some extent, 
the written internal moral sentiment.' ('En particulier si l'on a pu dire du 
code Napoleon qu'il etait la 'raison ecrite' nous avons cru travailler dans 
le sens de I'esprit national en moralisant notre droit autant que faire se 
pouvait, et nous serions heureux si l'on disait un jour du code civil suisse 
qu'il est un peu la conscience ecrite.' )49 Yet the same Virgile Rossel, as we 
saw in the first section, was well aware that the differences in the laws of the 
various Swiss Cantons could not be explained on the basis of religion, 
economy, language or 'race'. 
Thus, the Swiss codification was intended by those who worked on it to 
be the written moral consciousness of the Swiss people. The arbitrary rules 
of cantonal law were to be remedied by federal law appropriate to the 
conditions of the Swiss. The 'Swissness' of the codification is stressed. Yet 
the Swiss codification could be taken over, almost in its entirety, some years 
later by Turkey, a country with a vastly different history, legal tradition, 
religion, culture, economy, political setup, geographical and climatic 
circumstances. Turkey under Ataturk is a prime example not only of legal 
transplant but of revolution in law.50 
To the picture in chapter three I have nothing more directly to add, but it 
is frequently suggested to me that if the Reception was so natural then I 
47. June Starr, Dispute and Settlement in Rural Turkey (Leiden, 1978) 276. 
48. Eugen Huber, Erlauterungen zum Vorentwurf des Eidg. Justiz- und Polizeideparte- 
mentes (Bern, 2nd ed., 1914) 2. 
49. Virgile Rossel, Amtliches Stenographisches Bulletin der Schweizerischen Bundes- 
versammlung, Nationalrat (1905) 438. 
50. See Watson, Evolution, supra note 1 at 116. For an illuminating example of largely 
inappropriate rules being borrowed 'Just because they were there' see S.B. Burbank, 
'Procedural Rulemaking under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act of 1980', 131 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 283ff (1982). 
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ought to explain why it did not also occur in England. What follows then is 
a preliminary attempt at that explanation. 
A first point that should be stressed is that within the areas most affected 
by the Reception there were particular reasons for accepting easily the 
authority of Roman law. For the Italian states there was no problem in their 
seeing themselves as the direct descendants and heirs of the Roman legal 
tradition. Moreover, even during the period of personal rather than territorial 
law Roman law remained powerful: the Catholic Church in particular was 
governed by it. It had also had a powerful influence on Lombard law, both 
on the codifications and on its subsequent development, and the Lombard 
lawyers at the University of Pavia used Roman law as a universal subsidiary 
system to fill gaps.51 In France, the Reception was powerful in the South, 
the pays de droit ecrit, from a line on the coast just west of the Ile d'Oleron, 
proceeding roughly eastwards along a line just north of Saintonge, 
Languedoc, Lyonnais, Maconnais and Bresse. Apart from Poitou, Berry and 
Haute-Bourgogne which were territories of customary law, this territory 
was, in earlier times when personal law flourished, precisely the land of the 
Burgundians and the Visigoths who issued for their Gallo-Roman subjects 
the lex Romana Burgundionum and, more particularly, the highly prized and 
influential Breviarium Alaricianum.52 In these circumstances it is not 
surprising that Roman law was treated as the law of the land, but as law by 
custom; and in force only in so far as it was not replaced by a subsequent, 
dissonant custom. As for the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, 
that was regarded as a continuation of the Roman Empire from as early as 
the twelfth century; indeed the notion that the German empire was a 
continuation of the Roman Empire appears as early as the Carolingian 
period.53 In fact, some legislation of the Emperors Frederick I and II was 
interpolated into the Corpus Juris, and some doctrines of Roman law were 
seen as favoring the Emperor. In 1165 Frederick I spoke of 'the example of 
our divine Emperors who are our predecessors'. [MGH Const I, n. 227, 322 
c.3]54 In a constitution in the Libri Feudorum, 2.27, he describes himself as 
'Romanus Imperator'; and in another constitution recorded in the same 
work, 2.52, dated 7 November, 1136, Lothar calls himself the third 
'Imperator Romanorum'. 
Present-day Netherlands and Switzerland also experienced the Reception. 
But precisely at the most significant time, that of the translatio imperii, they 
formed part of the Holy Roman Empire. 
51. See e.g., Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (F. M. 
Powicke and A. B. Emden, ed., (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1936) 105. F. Calasso, Medio Evo 
del Diritto 1 (Milan, 1954), 161ff, 215ff, 235ff, 267ff, 305ff. 
52. See above all, E. Chdnon, Histoire Generale du Droit francais Public et Prive des 
Origines a 1815 1 (Paris, 1926) 488. 
53. See e.g. H. Conrad, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (Karlsruhe, 2nd ed., 1962) ii: 233f 
[hereinafter cited as Conrad, Rechtsgeschichte]. 
54. Ibid. at i: 234. 
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Secondly, it is easily overlooked that for a very long time England was by 
no means an exceptional case. The Reception even where the soil was 
fertile, was, as we shall see in the case of Germany and France, not fast. 
Thus, despite the 'theoretical Reception' in Germany (the notion that the 
Holy Roman Empire was a continuation of the Roman Empire), the 
'practical Reception' (the actual acceptance of Roman legal rules as living 
law) came much later. No sharp distinction can really be drawn between the 
'theoretical' and the 'practical Reception' but, for the latter, 1495 is usually 
regarded as a significant date when the Reichskammergericht was created as 
the supreme court of the Holy Roman Empire and when it was enacted that 
half of the judges of it should be doctores iuris, that is, judges trained in 
Roman law. Despite the enormous boost given to the Reception of Roman 
law in Germany by the theory of the continuation of empire, the real 
Reception in the sense of actual acceptance in practice is to be dated to the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.55 It was then that the Corpus Juris Civilis 
so far as glossed -'Quidquid non agnoscit glossa, non agnoscit curia'- 
was accepted as a whole as law, though indeed only as subsidiary law which 
was displaced by local statute or custom. 
The so-called 'Lotharian Legend', that the Emperor Lothar of Sup- 
plinburg had expressly received Roman law as statute in 1135, which was 
apparently the invention of Phillip Melancthon, was refuted by Hermann 
Conring in his De origine juris Germanici of 1643. Thereafter, both Italy 
and Germany had need of new theoretical answers to the question why the 
Corpus Juris Civilis was given authority. Into these we need not go.56 The 
Reception had already basically occurred. 
In France, in the pays de droit coutumier, the progress of the Reception 
was even slower. The various local coutumes were eventually to be reduced 
to writing (and converted into statute law) as a result of Charles VII's 
Ordonnance de Montil-les-Tours which was dated April 1453. The slow 
redaction of the coutumes was virtually complete by the middle of the 16th 
century.57 These written coutumes were influenced to various degrees by 
Roman law but in none did it appear as the predominant element. Much for 
the future was to depend on the outcome of a doctrinal battle which was 
mentioned in the preceding section. Some authorities, notably Pierre Lizet 
(1482-1554), First President of the Parlement of Paris, wanted Roman law 
to be the common law of France as lex scripta58 but this was opposed 
55. Conrad, Rechtsgeschichte, ii: 339ff. 
56. But see above all K. Luig, 'Der Geltungsgrund des romischen Rechts in 18. 
Jahrhundert in Italien, Frankreich und Deutschland' in La Formazione storica del 
Diritto moderno in Europa 2 (1977) 819ff [hereinafter cited as Luig, 'Geltungs- 
grund']. 
57. For more detail and references see, e.g., A. Watson, Sources of Law, Legal Change, and 
Ambiguity (Philadelphia, 1984) 47ff [hereinafter cited as Watson, Sources of Law]. 
58. In fact he inserted much Roman law into the customs he drew up, such as that of Berry; 
see R. Filhol, Le premier president Christofle de Thou (Paris, 1937) especially at 67. 
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vigorously by others such as Christophe de Thou, (1508-1582) also First 
President of the Parlement of Paris, Guy Coquille (1523-1603), Etienne 
Pasquier (1529-1615), and later by Nicholas Catherinot (1628-1688) who 
wanted Roman law treated only as ratio scripta. The distinction was crucial. 
If Roman law was only ratio scripta then, in the absence of a rule in the 
coutume, it would have authority for a judge only if it were in harmony with 
the principles of the coutume, only if it appeared just (and then for the judge 
its authority was precisely because it was just); and the judge could prefer 
the authority of another coutume such as the Coutume de Paris. But if 
Roman law were lex scripta and was thus the law in force in the absence of 
a contrary custom, then the judge would have to apply it. In the event, in 
accordance with the spirit of the Ordonnance of Phillipe-le-Bel of 1312, 
Roman law was treated only as ratio scripta in most of the pays de droit 
coutumier.59 The main exceptions, where the coutumes expressly adopted 
Roman law in the absence of a relevant provision, were the Coutumes of 
Berry, Haute-Marche, Auvergne and Bourbonnais which were adjacent to 
the pays de droit ecrit, the Coutumes of Burgundy, Franche-Comte and les 
Trois-Eveches which were close to the territory of the Holy Roman Empire, 
and some of the coutumes in Flanders.60 This apparent influence of 
geography is very revealing. 
The debate on the nature of the authority of Roman law may be seen as 
part of, or related to, a larger issue, namely the unification of the coutumes. 
This was above all the great desire of Charles Dumoulin or Molinaeus 
(1500-1566), who was to have a preponderant influence in future devel- 
opment, though not perhaps in a way that he envisaged. The Coutume de 
Paris of 1510 was very short and incomplete. In 1539 Dumoulin published 
his treatise on fiefs, which was the beginning of a commentary on this 
Coutume. Here he expressed his criticisms and proposed new approaches, 
most of which were adopted by the Parlement of Paris. Consequently there 
was disaccord between the Coutume and the case law which led to the 
promulgation in 1580 of a much larger and improved Coutume de Paris 
under the guidance of Christophe de Thou. The Parlement of Paris operated 
in effect as a court of appeal for many other towns; its 'ressort' covered the 
jurisdiction of fifty municipal and local coutumes. Etienne Pasquier, who 
had participated in the preparation of the new Coutume de Paris held that in 
these fifty jurisdictions the Coutume de Paris should be known and followed 
'because', as he put it, 'Paris was in this kingdom what Rome was in the 
Empire'. This called forth the wrath of Guy Coquille who believed that other 
coutumes should be used equally with the Coutumes de Paris to supplement 
the local law.61 
In fact the Coutume de Paris was to prove very acceptable in other 
59. For the doctrinal debate see above all V. Guizzi, 'I1 diritto comune in Francia nel xvii 
secolo', T.v.R. 37 (1969), Iff; Luig, 'Geltungsgrund', supra note 56 at 832ff. 
60. See above all, E. Ch6non, Histoire generale 2 (1929) 331f. 
61. See above all, ibid. at 317ff; Watson, Sources of Law, supra note 57 at 70f. 
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jurisdictions. A significant step in that direction occurred in 1747 when 
Francais Bourjon published Le Droit Commun de la France et la Coutume 
de Paris. The opening paragraph of this work seems obscure until one 
realizes that he is treating the common law of France and the Coutume de 
Paris as the same thing. This in itself is indicative of the success of the 
Coutume but in its turn Bourjon's large and clear text spread the message 
that the Coutume de Paris was the law of France. 
But one must not exaggerate the extent to which there had not been a 
Reception of Roman law in France, on the eve of the Revolution. First, of 
course, there was a full Reception in the pays de droit ecrit. Secondly, this 
Reception had a continued effect on the pays de droit coutumier because 
through it Roman rules and solutions were known since books on the law of 
France set out the law in the pays de droit ecrit as well as the provisions of 
the various coutumes. Thirdly, even when a jurisdiction looked to the 
Coutume de Paris or some other coutume to fill gaps, when a solution was 
not found in that way recourse was still had to Roman law. And even the 
reformed Coutume de Paris had many gaps, with only 372 articles. 
Fourthly, French jurists, even those most addicted to their coutumes had 
deep knowledge of and great respect for Roman law. Roman law is 
prominent in their works. The influential Robert Pothier (1699-1722) may 
serve as an example. Fourthly, many books, including that of Bourjon, 
show the influence of Justinian's Institutes on their structure. This is 
especially true of institutional writings62 such as Gabriel Argou's Institution 
du droitfranfais which was first published in 1692 and reached its eleventh 
edition in 1787. The structure of the French code civil is similar to that of 
the works of Bourjon and Argou. Thus, the Reception, even in favored 
locales such as Germany and France, was slow. 
A third point that is frequently downplayed is that much Roman law was 
actually borrowed by English law. Around 1600 Thomas Craig, in his Jus 
Feudale, at 1.7.22,3 puts it this way: 'The Civil Law is rarely used in 
England, and although among the English are found very learned men in 
every branch of learning, still there are few who devote themselves to the 
Civil Law, they are content with a bowing acquaintance with it, since native 
institutions and customs are more in use with them: hence the learned say 
that the English use municipal law when the Scots are governed by the Civil 
Law. But so little are they free from the Civil Law in their judgments, that 
reasons and decisions of it, as if living sparks, are found in all matters and 
controversies which they, however, prefer to ascribe to their own men than 
to owe to the ancient jurists. In the event a great dependence on the Civil 
Law shines forth in all controversies to such an extent that an expert in Civil 
Law understands that the greatest controversies of English law can be 
62. For this notion see K. Luig, 'The Institutes of National Law in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth Centuries,' Juridical Review (1972), 193ff; J. Cairns, 'Institutional 
Writings in Scotland Reconsidered', Journal of Legal History 4 (1983) 76ff. For 
France and the code civil see now above all C. Chene, L'Enseignement du Droit 
francais en pays de droit ecrit (1679-1793) (Geneva, 1982) especially at 323ff. 
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decided according to the sources of the Civil Law and the replies of the 
jurisconsults or Emperors, as often appears from the reports of Plowden and 
Dyer.' As elsewhere, Craig exaggerates: his motivation is to indicate that 
the differences between Scots law and English law are not so great as are 
often supposed. And yet, without some considerable admixture of Roman 
law into England, his claim would have appeared simply ridiculous. 
Accuracy, in the state of the evidence, is difficult to attain, but what can 
surely be stated is that the influence of Roman law in England varied from 
time to time and from type of court jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
In this instance it is perhaps sensible not to begin at the beginning. 
Writing of formularies, of collections of writs, Milsom claims: 
In one respect the most illuminating of these formularies was that which acquired the 
title Brevia Placitata. Dating from soon after the middle of the thirteenth century, it is 
a conflated formulary giving both writs and counts. But the writs, which in real life were 
always in Latin, are here translated into French, the language in which counts, at any rate 
in the king's courts, were actually spoken, the ordinary language of the upper classes. 
This collection was for the use, or more probably the instruction, of professional men, 
literate men, but men not at home in the Latin tongue and not interested in the riches to 
which it gave access. The common law had started its career as an alternative learning, 
cut off from even the legal learning of the universities which until the eighteenth century 
taught only Roman and canon law. 
Almost at the same time as the counters' modest Brevia Placitata Bracton gave final 
shape to a much larger and more ambitious book; and it is one of the important facts in 
the history of western thought that the former was to prove fruitful, the latter sterile.63 
By the last sentence of his first paragraph, Milsom means, I think, not that 
the origins of the common law lay in an alternative learning, cut off from the 
universities, but that it was at this time around the middle of the thirteenth 
century that the common law cut itself off from the universities and became 
an alternative learning. If this interpretation is correct then Milsom's 
position, I suppose, would be that in England, as elsewhere in Europe in, 
say, the eleventh century, the local law was more or less free from Roman 
influence but that influence began to be felt in England as elsewhere, though 
not necessarily so early or so powerfully, until it was disrupted in the age of, 
or succeeding, Bracton. 
Thus, the law book written apparently shortly before 1118 which is 
known as Leges Henrici Primi64 cites for instance Salic and Ripuarian laws 
and Frankish capitularies; hence it is significant as John Barton, the leading 
expert on Roman law in medieval England, observes that there are so few 
traces of Roman law.65 No attempt was being made by the author to 
Romanise. Another private work of the time, the Leis Willelme, contains 
some Roman law, but of this Barton endorses Maitland's judgment: 'It 
63. Foundations, supra note 2 at 40f. 
64. F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, History of English Law 1 (Cambridge, reissued 1968), 
99f [hereinafter cited as History]. 
65. John Barton, Roman Law in England (Milan, 1971) 7 [hereinafter cited as Barton, 
Roman Law]. 
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shows us how men were helplessly looking about for some general 
principles of Jurisprudence which would deliver them from their practical 
and intellectual difficulties.'66 
The treatise written in the 1180s and which goes under Glanvill's name is 
a very practical work based on what was happening in the royal courts. 'The 
author is writing of matters which are in regular use and within his own 
experience. If there are cases which the King's court is not prepared to deal 
with, he says so. He is under no temptation to fill the gaps with matter 
borrowed from Salian or Ripuarian Franks or, for the matter of that, from 
Roman law. By the same token, when he does borrow from the civil law, 
this is a very much more significant circumstance than the use of a few 
maxims by the author of the Leis Willelme.'67 Some use is made of Roman 
terminology though not always with the Roman meaning,68 and book ten 
which treats of the English equivalents of Roman contracts shows some 
acquaintance with Roman law. But despite the use of the Roman contractual 
terms the substantive law looks very different: 'The most striking feature of 
this book of the treatise is the conflict, if this be not too strong a term, 
between the form and the substance.'69 
Henry of Bracton was a royal judge who died in 1268. The treatise, De 
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Anglie, which goes under his name shows very 
considerable knowledge both of Roman law directly and of the learned 
continental jurists, notably Azo.70 The arrangement of the work also owes 
much to the structure of Justinian's Institutes. What is not so easily 
determined is the extent to which Roman law had influenced the substance 
of English law. As Barton puts it, at times Bracton Romanises but at other 
times he is clearly anglicizing. How far Bracton accurately depicts the 
common law and the extent to which English rules in resembling Roman 
rules betray their origin are questions too difficult to be resolved here. What 
concerns us more is the likelihood that, because of the Romanised 
appearance of the De Legibus, if Bracton's treatise had been influential and 
if he had been followed on the Bench by others trained as he was, England 
would have undergone a Reception. But as Milsom noted, it was the Brevia 
Placitata that was to prevail. 
Yet, to contrast England with continental states of the period, one should 
not ignore the success of the unromanised works such as the Brevia 
Placitata. After all, not so long before-certainly before 1235, probably 
between 1221 and 1224-had been written the enormously successful 
66. History, supra note 64 at 1, 102; quoted by Barton, Roman Law, supra note 65 at 8. 
67. Ibid. at 9. 
68. See G. D. G. Hall, ed., The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England 
commonly called Glanvill (London, 1965) xxxvi. 
69. Barton, Roman Law, supra note 65 at 11. 
70. See above all, ibid. at 13ff. 
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Sachsenspiegel.71 Originally in Latin it was rapidly turned into low German, 
probably East Saxon, by its author, Eike van Repgow. It was in turn 
translated into other German dialects, Dutch and back into Latin. Of its two 
parts, over 200 manuscripts survive of the 'Landrecht' and nearly 150 of the 
'Lehnrecht'. Its influence was great well beyond the confines of the area 
whose customary law it described. And, in France too, even much later than 
Bracton, books such as the Tres Ancienne Coutume de Bretagne of 1315 
were to prove influential. The clue to the different development that is 
taking place and will continue lies not in the use made of Roman law in these 
works. In England, France and Germany alike, there were books very much 
influenced by Roman law and books which were very much less so. Both 
existed side-by-side. But whereas books such as the Sachsenspiegel and 
French works on customary law set out the substantive law, the English 
works such as the Brevia Placitata,72 Novae Narrationes,73 Placita 
Coronae,74 and the Court Baron75 are formularies setting out writs and 
pleadings. The successful English works are geared very narrowly to aiding 
the practising lawyer to bring the suit in the proper formal manner. This was 
to be the direction for English law in the succeeding centuries. And here 
Roman law had no role to play. 
Bracton may be regarded as the high-water mark of the influence of 
Roman law in medieval England. The attitude to Roman law in medieval 
England, as in Scotland and continental Europe, corresponded to that 
described by the present writer in a general account of the Reception of 
Roman law: customary systems of law are very much disposed to borrow 
from a mature, detailed system in writing even when the latter is constructed 
on very different lines and was created for very different social, economic 
and political conditions. But the borrowings may be very slow and 
piecemeal. The reasons are not hard to find. 
What is in issue here, in fact, is not that England did not borrow from 
Roman law when others were doing so-it also did -but the question is 
why England alone did not come to accept the Corpus Juris Civilis as 
authoritative. We have already seen part of the answer. Lands prominent in 
the Reception had particular reasons for accepting the Corpus Juris as 
authoritative. And for a long time England was not so different from other 
territories. But more must be said to explain why, in the result, England was 
the odd-man-out. 
Before we do that, though, a word must be said about Roman law in later 
71. For this see in English, A. Watson, Sources of Law, supra note 57 at 28ff. 
72. G. T. Turner and T. F. T. Plucknett, eds., Brevia Placitata, Selden Society, 66, 
(London, 1951). 
73. E. Shanks and S. F. C. Milsom, eds., Novae Narrationes, Selden Society, 80, 
(London, 1963). 
74. J. M. Kaye, ed., Placitata Coronae, Selden Society, Supp. Ser., iv, (London, 1966). 
75. F. W. Maitland, ed., Court Baron, Selden Society, 4, (London, 1890). 
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England. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was an upsurge of 
the influence of Roman law, particularly in substance. It is this which lends 
some credence to the paragraph of Craig set out at the beginning of this 
section. But after Bracton there was never a danger of a Reception in the 
sense of the Corpus Juris Civilis becoming authoritative.76 
A fourth point to be emphasized is that, before the Corpus Juris Civilis is 
treated as the law of the land or as directly and highly persuasive, Roman 
law is influential and infiltrates other systems by filling the gaps. The 
greater the gaps the greater the potential for Roman law influence. As Craig 
(1.2.14) puts it: 'In Scotland there is the greatest scarcity of written laws and 
therefore, naturally, in most matters we follow the Civil Law. Not because 
we are learned or well-grounded in it, because to this point no one-so far 
as I am aware-were professors of law who taught law publicly (which is of 
course to be regretted), but almost against our will, since we are deprived of 
our own written law we are led there by the sole beneficence of nature or the 
worth of that law.' 
Here we are, of course, speaking of private law, the sphere in which lay 
the achievement of the Romans. But English private law developed 
precociously. Statutes were very important for private law from an early 
date. Thus, Henry II (1154-89) can be characterized as 'a great legislator'77 
and Edward I (1272-1307) was responsible for some of the most important 
laws in English history.78 Maitland, indeed, goes so far as to say: 'The 
vigorous legislation of the time has an important consequence in checking 
the growth of unenacted law.'79 This consequence, he believes is revealed 
both in the check to the further advance of Roman law which had been 
growing in importance under Henry III (1216-72) and in hampering further 
development by case law. And early there was developed a system of King's 
courts, applying the same law through the country. National courts, as 
distinct from local courts, apply to far more people: there are more cases and 
relevant law is more readily established. And, as we shall see, precedent 
was regarded early on as important in England for fixing the law. 
The mention of the King's courts brings us to a fifth point, the writ system 
which has Anglo-Saxon roots.80 The need to have a writ to bring the cause 
before the court meant that high priority was centered on that and on proof, 
76. See, e.g., W. Holdsworth, History of English Law (London, 3rd ed., 1945) iv: 283ff; 
B. P. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England (Oxford, 1973) 122ff; J. H. Baker, 
Introduction to English Legal History, (London, 2nd ed., 1979) 36f. [hereinafter cited 
as Baker, Introduction]. Significantly, Milsom does not mention any danger of a 
Reception in that period: Foundations, supra note 2. 
77. F. W. Maitland, Constitutional History of England (Cambridge, 1920) 10 [hereinafter 
cited as Maitland, History]. 
78. Ibid. at 18ff. 
79. Ibid. at 21. 
80. See, e.g., R. C. van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law (Cambridge, 
1973) 30. 
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rather than on systematic development of legal rules. S. F. C. Milsom goes 
so far as to claim that from, say, the thirteenth to the early sixteenth century 
the lawyers did not see the law as a system of substantive rules at all, and 
he contrasts them with Bracton and his kind who 'were accustomed to think 
in terms of substantive law'. But Bracton's was the last English law-book 
for centuries to be written with such terms in mind.81 With such a 
framework the infiltration of Roman law would be no easy matter. It could 
either take the citadel by storm-which did not happen-or leave the field. 
And the emphasis in England on what happened in court led early to the 
high practical standing of precedent. Craig (1.7.20) says: 'If nothing is 
settled by the principles of the common law or by custom (general or 
manorial) then in similar cases the authority of previous decisions, espe- 
cially of the King's Bench, prevails. And now disputes are settled primarily 
in this way if it is shown that it was previously decided otherwise. Nor is 
there any defense to this form of judging unless the case can be distinguished 
for it very often happens that the whole situation of fact for the decision is 
changed by minute circumstances of fact. Hence come the many volumes of 
cases (for so the situations of fact are called) in Plowden, in Dyer and 
others.' And he demonstrates the rather lower value of precedent in Scotland 
(1.8.13,14,15). Yet Scotland, along with England, were the main countries 
where institutional writers cited precedent as authority for propositions of 
law.82 This is as true of Lord Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland (first 
edition 1681) as of John Cowell, Institutiones Iuris Anglicani (first edition 
1605). But even much earlier, Bracton's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus 
Angliae of the thirteenth century (now thought to have been written in the 
1220s and 1230s and brought up to date by Bracton in the 1240s and 
1250s)83 contains about 500 references to decided cases. Case law was an 
important source of legal growth in the reign of Henry III (1216-72) and the 
first Year Books, the earliest English law reports, date from 1292. 
The use of precedent also militates against the infiltration of Roman law. 
First, there are fewer gaps to be filled. Secondly, gaps can be filled by 
analogy with previous cases. Thirdly, where judges are given the high social 
status of lawmakers-even if they talk as if their role was that of 
law-finders-they will bolster their own position and prestige by relying on 
the authority of other judges rather than looking elsewhere for authority. 
One final factor which is by no means the least important and which 
perhaps deserves pride of place for England being different from the other 
states of western Europe in its attitude to Roman law is feudalism and the 
different standing of feudal law in England. 
To begin with, feudalism by its very nature ought to operate as a powerful 
81. Foundations, supra note 2 at 43f. 
82. But elsewhere, too, an institutional writer might refer to precedent. A notable example 
from southern France is Claude Serres, Les Institutions du droitfrancois suivant l'ordre 
de celles de Justinien (Montpellier, 1753). 
83. See, e.g., Baker, Introduction, supra note 76 at 101. 
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barrier to the encroachment of Roman law. The law flowing from feudalism 
affects the most powerful interests. Landholding is central to the feudal 
system, and land was the basis of wealth in the Middle Ages. The feudal 
relationship was primarily knightly and military. Wealth and high social 
status go together in ensuring that legal rules deriving from feudalism will 
have a major impact on law in general. But the concepts and categories that 
flow naturally from feudalism into feudal law cut across those of Roman law 
to such an extent that they make Roman law seem irrelevant within their 
sphere of influence. Thus, firstly, by its very nature feudal law makes no 
distinction between public and private law, partaking of both, whereas the 
foremost distinction in Roman law is into public and private, with the stress 
almost entirely on the latter. As Maitland puts it, 'we may describe 
"feudalism" as a state of society in which all or a great part of public rights 
and duties are inextricably linked with the tenure of land, in which the whole 
governmental system-financial, military, judicial-is part of the law of 
private property'.84 Secondly, for the law of persons in feudal law the most 
important division is into lord and vassal, a division that has no place in 
Roman law. Thirdly and more importantly, fealty, a central element in the 
feudal system, is an obligation or one side of an obligation or partly an 
obligation. But it does not fit neatly into Roman notions: looked at from a 
Romanist point of view it is in some sense a contract but it has very different 
effects from contract. Moreover, the other contracts which are so familiar 
from Roman law have no role to play in feudal law. Fourthly, Roman law, 
especially as set out in the Corpus Juris Civilis, made scarcely any 
distinction between land and moveable property. But for feudal law, only 
land was usually relevant. Moreover, the feudal grant of land in England 
was for an estate in the land, a time in the land, and not of ownership. The 
whole doctrine of estates as it was to develop was unknown to Roman law. 
In addition the acquisition of an estate involved a formal ceremony, of 
fealty, and such ceremonies were unknown to the Corpus Juris. Fifthly, the 
nature of the feudal grant had an automatic impact on the law of succession. 
Since originally an estate in land ended on death there would be no feudal 
succession to land. Gradually, it came to be expected that the lord would 
renew. Still, this would mean in the case of land that there would be no 
testate succession: the lord would not want the vassal to have a right of 
choosing the next vassal. Also it would mean that primogeniture would be 
favored: the lord would not want the vassal's obligations to him to be 
divided among a number of people. And there would be a preference for 
males: the main obligation of the vassal was military service which could not 
be performed by a female. These characteristics are very different from 
those of Roman law, where testacy was freely permitted, where no 
distinctions were drawn for inheritance between land and movables, where 
there was no primogeniture and where for the most part male and female 
were equally entitled to inherit, both under a will and on intestacy. Thus, in 
84. Maitland, History, supra note 77 at 23f. 
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all branches of substantive law, feudal law presented a very different face 
from Roman law. In addition, in all feudal relations the superior retained the 
power of jurisdiction over his vassal.85 The more important feudal law was 
in a society, the greater the obstacle it presented against the Corpus Juris 
becoming authoritative. 
But feudal law was bound to have a greater impact in England than 
elsewhere. On the one hand, it was only in England that land holding 
involved the doctrine of estates that resulted in so much convoluted legal 
reasoning and learning. Such was the overwhelming importance of this 
subject that it is scarcely surprising that Milsom can say that 'Littleton could 
write his Tenures, which can properly be regarded as a text-book of land 
law, nearly four centuries before text-books were written on other branches 
of the law'.86 But such massive emphasis on a topic where Roman law was 
irrelevant would reduce the general authority of Roman law. And borrowing 
is often from a system which has achieved general respect. Moreover, pride 
in one native English achievement would increase the native self-confidence 
to go it alone in other fields of law. On the other hand, England, with 
Normandy and Brittany following hard upon, was the only territory where 
all of the land was held in feudal tenure. Where land is allodial, or not in 
feudal tenure, non-feudal principles will determine ownership, transfer, 
rights of succession and so on. Another system will have to apply, and 
Roman law is an obvious resource. On this argument it is not surprising that 
at the time of the French Revolution, Normandy and Brittany had received 
relatively little of Roman law. And it is consistent with this argument that 
Friesland whose law was notoriously more Romanized than the other United 
Provinces had relatively more of its land held allodially than had the others. 
In a very different way feudal law would be more of a barrier to the 
penetration of Roman law in England than elsewhere. The Libri Feudorum 
are the greatest monuments of the feudal law and seem to have been 
composed mainly in Milan in the first half of the twelfth century. A second 
version contained constitutions of the Emperor Frederick I, dating from 
1154 and 1158. Hugolinus, the Bolognese jurist, completed a third version 
and the books acquired a semi-official status87 when he inserted it in the 
volumen parvum which contained the Institutes and the Authenticum (a 
version of the Novellae) of the Corpus Juris. In fact it was treated as an 
appendix to the nine collationes of the Authenticum and hence was even 
called the tenth, decem collatio. It was glossed like the parts of the Corpus 
Juris Civilis-that name is later-and the gloss was accepted into the Glossa 
Ordinaria of Accursius. Its fate and fortune was thus linked with those of 
the Corpus Juris. It was even taught along with it, and the same celebrated 
85. See, e.g., Craig, Jus Feudale, 1.9.3.6. 
86. Foundations, supra note 2 at 3f. 
87. See, e.g., General Survey of Events, Sources, Persons and Movements in Continental 
Legal History by various European authors (Boston, 1912) 74 (by C. Calisse). 
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European scholars like Cuiacius, Baldus, Julius Clarus, Hotman, wrote on 
both. 
But this linking of the Libri Feudorum with the Corpus Juris Civilis 
would restrict the impact of feudalism to feudal law. To begin with, the 
elements of the Corpus Juris, in particular the Digest and Code, had such a 
high status and were so detailed that the Libri Feudorum could scarcely 
encroach. Then again, the Libri Feudorum were much less detailed, and 
treating them with the Corpus Juris would result in the gaps, inconsisten- 
cies, ambiguities in the Libri Feudorum being resolved or filled by the 
Corpus Juris. Craig, 1.9.36 puts it this way in discussing the nine 
characteristic qualities of feus (1.9.36): 'Third, any point in relation to a feu 
which is not expressly settled in the Libri Feudorum ought to be decided by 
the Jus Civile or the law of the Romans. Feudal decisions, on the other hand, 
have no relevance except in relation to feudal questions.' 
Again, and even more significantly, with this continental attitude towards 
the Libri Feudorum and feudal law, when feudalism as a social system 
declined, as it began to do early with the decline of knight service, there 
would be no obstacle from feudal law to using the rules and categories of the 
Corpus Juris to develop the local law. 
But the Libri Feudorum were used in this way only in continental Europe 
and in Scotland: not in England. There is no trace of their ever having 
influence on English law, and no sign of any knowledge of them in English 
works such as Littleton on Tenures. But where the Libri Feudorum, 
restricted and reined in by the Corpus Juris, were not used, there were not 
these obstacles to feudal law dominating the legal scene and hindering legal 
growth on other principles, and to remaining dominant long after feudalism 
itself had declined. 
As we have seen, there is a strong tendency for legal rules, structures and 
concepts to continue in life long after the social structure has died. So it was 
with feudal law in England after the death of feudalism. And feudal law was 
the dominant part of English law, and its ideas were very different from 
those of Roman law. 
Feudal law was thus a major factor in preventing the Corpus Juris from 
becoming authoritative in England while being much less of an obstacle 
elsewhere. I am tempted by a paradox: it was above all the failure to receive 
the Corpus Juris Civilis as authoritative in England that led to the failure in 
England to accept the Corpus Juris Civilis as authoritative. The steps in the 
paradox are: failure to receive the Corpus Juris Civilis as authoritative 
involves the failure to receive the Libri Feudorum as authoritative: at a 
certain stage in Western European history feudalism, and with it the legal 
rules relating to the feudal system, is very potent for development; rules of 
feudal law cut across the notions of Roman law; for the rest of Western 
Europe the most important ideas of feudal law are contained in the Libri 
Feudorum; where the Corpus Juris Civilis is treated as authoritative, the 
Libri Feudorum are appended to it and treated as subsidiary; it is this 
relationship which keeps feudal law to its proper sphere, and causes its 
decline when feudalism declines. 
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IV 
In the fourth chapter of The Evolution of Law I tried to show how the 
themes of the three preceding chapters-the importance of the legal tradition 
itself for legal development, the nature of customary law and the Reception 
of Roman law-come together in Western legal history, choosing as an 
example a single Scottish case of the seventeenth century in which the legal 
discussion centered on the corresponding provisions of Roman law although 
they were not economically appropriate and were not a necessary part of 
Scots law. Judging is rooted in the legal tradition to the neglect of local 
societal conditions. No legal case, I maintained, can be understood as law 
in action if one neglects the legal tradition that sets the parameters of debate. 
The tradition is not noticed by the actors who live it, and they are unaware 
of its impact. They know not what they do. 
Elsewhere I have given examples from other systems where to outsiders 
judges acted in an extreme way and obtained inappropriate results, but 
where the judges thought of themselves as good judges acting out the rules 
of the judging game according to their own particular tradition.88 
Naturally enough, courts such as those in Scotland and South Africa, do 
not always show themselves to be unaware of changed circumstances when 
they reason from Roman or Roman-Dutch law. But even then the legal 
culture may also emerge clearly. I should like to cite an example from 
Scotland, Halkerston v. Wedderburn of 1781: 
Mr. Halkerston, thinking his garden at Inveresk injured by a row of elms, the branches 
of which hung over it from the garden of Mr. Wedderburn, applied to the Sheriff for 
redress. After various steps of procedure, the cause was moved to the Court of Session 
by advocation; when the following abstract question came to be considered, viz. 
Whether a person is bound to allow his property to be overshaded by the trees belonging 
to a conterminous heritor? 
Pleaded for Mr. Wedderburn; The climate of Scotland is such as has induced the 
legislature to encourage the planting of forest-trees in hedge rows, for the sake of 
shelter; and, for some time, it was even imposed as a duty upon every proprietor; act 
1661, cap. 41. This, however, would have been an elusory enactment, if the common 
law permitted a conterminous heritor to lop such trees, whenever their branches 
extended beyond the line of march. By the common law, an heritor may plant so near 
the march, in praediis rusticis, that the trees will protrude their branches into the air, 
over the adjacent ground; nor is there any thing in that law, which authorises the 
conterminous heritor to lop off such branches, unless he can qualify a material damage 
arising from their protrusion. 
In England, as well as in Scotland, the highways are understood to be vested in the 
King, for behoof of the public; yet in both kingdoms, statutes have been found necessary 
to authorize Justices of the Peace, Way-wardens, &c. to cause prune trees hanging over 
the road; which could not have been the case, had the common law allowed any such 
power to a conterminous heritor. 
In like manner, though the Roman law allowed the proprietor of a praedium rusticum 
to prune such trees to the height of fifteen feet, yet this was not a right inherent in him 
upon the principles of common law, but was derived from the laws of the twelve tables, 
88. 'A House of Lords Judgement, and Other Tales of the Absurd', American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1985), 673ff. 
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and confirmed by an edict of the Praetor; L.I.?7, 8, 9. D. De arb. caed. And this very 
limitation of the right shews, that the Romans did not think the protrusion of branches 
in itself any encroachment upon the right of property; except so far as it obstructed or 
impeded the immediate exercise of it. They considered the air as a res communis, 
incapable of appropriation; and thought, that no encroachment upon it afforded a proper 
ground of challenge. 
Answered for Mr. Halkerston; It is understood to be a general rule of law, that no 
person is entitled to encroach upon the property of another, unless he can show a right 
of servitude to that effect. One may dig a trench upon his own property, though the 
effect of it may be, to cut the roots, and destroy the whole of his neighbour's trees. He 
may raise his wall to any given height; and, in doing so, he may cut down every branch 
that stands in his way. While a branch from his neighbour's tree does him no harm, he 
will allow it to remain, upon the same principle of good neighborhood, that he allows 
him to hunt over his fields, or to angle in his stream. But the moment this branch does 
him a real or an imaginary injury; whenever, in short, he wishes to remove it, the law 
entitles him to do so, in the same manner, and upon the same principles, that it entitles 
him to protect his property from any other kind of encroachment. 
The regulations for the encouragement of planting and inclosing, introduced by the 
act 1661, can never apply, with any propriety, to two contiguous gardens in the village 
of Inveresk; and it is not very obvious how the powers given by statute to the public 
officers entrusted with the care of high-ways, at all derogate from the private right of 
parties to demand what they are empowered to do. 
Neither does the argument on the other side derive any support from the Roman law. 
The edict referred to, related only to praedia rustica; but, where a similar 
encroachment was made upon a praedium urbanum, as seems more properly to be the 
case here, another edict of the Praetor authorised the whole tree to be cut down; L. I. 
? 2. D. De arb. caed. At any rate, it is nothing to us, in what manner the Romans chose 
to limit the natural right now contended for. Under an Italian sun, it might probably be 
thought, that there could not be too much shade; but the same idea can never be 
entertained in a northern climate; and, accordingly, the learned Groenwegen, in his 
treatise, De legibus abrogatis et inusitatis, in Hollandia vicinisque regionibus, says 
expressly, 'Si arbor fundo, vel aedibus alienis impendeat, nostris et Gallorum moribus, 
non totam arborem a stirpe exscindere sed id quod super excurrit in totum adimere 
licet; tit. De arb. caed.' 
The Court had no doubt upon the principle; and, therefore, adhered to the Lord 
Ordinary's interlocutor, 'Remitting the cause to the Sheriff, with this instruction, that he 
find Mr. Wedderburn is bound to prune his trees in such a manner, as they may not hang 
over the mutual wall, and thereby be of prejudice to Mr. Halkerston's fruit and 
garden. '89 
As is usual for the time the advocates' arguments are given much more 
prominence than the judges' reasoning. For the defender maintaining his 
right to have his trees overhang and overshadow the pursuer's garden it was 
argued that there was no obstacle thereto at Roman common law; though it 
was conceded that by statute, namely the XII Tables, the aggrieved 
neighbor could prune such trees up to fifteen feet from the ground, and that 
this was confirmed by edict. This distinction between common law and 
statute is based on the notion that statute is an encroachment and ought to 
be interpreted strictly. The notion itself came into Scots law from England 
and was unknown to the Romans. The argument is a blending of the two 
foreign elements in Scots law: the scope of a Roman rule should better be 
89. Halkerston v. Wedderburn (1781) M. 10495. 
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determined by Roman principles, not by much later English ideas. In fact 
the XII Tables, the codification of the fifth century B.C., was regarded as 
the foundation of all Roman law.90 Thus, the defender wants to give as 
restricted a scope as possible to the Roman rules, but never does he argue 
that they ought to be treated as irrelevant. Yet Roman law was not the law 
in Scotland, though it could be treated as of great authority. 
The argument for the pursuer is of more interest for us. First it is claimed 
that in fact under the edict, the overhung neighbor had full right to cut down 
the offending tree. Then comes the argument from changed circumstances. 
Even if, it is suggested, the Romans did restrict the right to prune or cut 
down overhanging trees, that is of no relevance for Scotland: 'Under an 
Italian sun, it might probably be thought, that there could not be too much 
shade; but the same idea can never be entertained in a northern climate.' Yet 
the presumption that Roman law applies has to be rebutted by legal authority 
and since there was none for Scotland9l the pursuer looks to Holland and 
France: 'If a tree overhangs another's land or buildings, then, by our and 
French custom it is not permitted to cut out the whole tree from the root, but 
to remove completely what overhangs.' This quotation he takes very 
significantly from Groenewegen, De legibus abrogatis et inusitatis, in 
Hollandia vicinisque regionibus, (1649) a work which as the title shows is 
dedicated to setting out the Roman rules which were not accepted or were 
abrogated in Holland and neighboring territories.92 
V 
The conclusions of this paper remain those that I drew in chapter five 
of The Evolution of Law. Legal change comes about through the culture of 
the legal elite, the law makers, and it is above all determined by that 
culture. 
But law is not the culture of the legal elite alone and it is not the only 
culture of the legal elite. As to the first of these, law is also the cultural 
heritage of other lawyers and of society at large. But to effect change, other 
lawyers and other members of society have to operate on and through the 
legal elite, whereas the elite can initiate change on its own.93 
As to the second of these, the law-making elite also partakes of the 
general culture of society. Thus, where the society as a whole or its ruling 
elite is cosmopolitan or innovative, the law making elite will tend to be 
90. See e.g. D. 1.2.2.6; Cicero, de oratore, 1.44.195. 
91. On the paucity of Scottish authority see J. Rankine, The Law of Land-ownership in 
Scotland (Edinburgh, 4th ed., 1909) 631ff. 
92. For a South African case in which changed circumstances-this time of law-were 
taken into account see Simons and Others v. Board of Executors 1915 C.P.D. 479. 
93. See already A. Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture', University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (1983) 1121ff, especially at 1151ff. 
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cosmopolitan or innovative. The general culture has many strands and 
many roots, resulting from geography, history, economics, politics, 
religion and so on and it is as part of the general culture that these factors 
influence law making. But what has to be stressed is, as we have seen, the 
very powerful role that the legal culture itself has on law making. The 
law-making elite comes to regard law as existing in large measure in its 
own right, as an end in itself, as having its being distinct from other 
institutions of society. 
Legal change also comes about by organized pressure from outside of the 
legal elite. But when it does, the emerging law is still given its contours by 
the law-making elite.94 
Two restrictions on all of the above should be set forth right at the end of 
this paper so that their importance should not be ignored. The first is that the 
argument here is not that the law-making elite is never aware of, and fully 
responsive to, wider societal conditions. It may well be, and the legal rules 
on a particular topic may well be entirely satisfactory for those making use 
of them. It may be for instance that at times the business community will 
have such close contacts with some part of the legal elite in the shape of 
academics whom it hires as consultants that their concerns are very much the 
same, and a view of law is proferred which is in harmony with commercial 
interests. Even then, of course, in a developed system that view of law put 
forward by academics will prevail only if it is also adopted by judges and the 
legislature who, in their turn, are also of course blinkered by their own part 
of the tradition. My point is only that it is the legal elite who shape the legal 
rules, that they are fixed within their cultural tradition, and that to a very 
considerable extent the rules often do not meet the needs and desires of those 
who use them and that that is not a matter of immediate concern to the legal 
elite. No better illustration of this can be found than in English land law 
which for centuries until 1925 (at the earliest) was very unsatisfactory for 
land owners and was beneficial to no one (except practising lawyers). Those 
who had no property had no concern with the rules, those who had were also 
those who as judges and legislators were in a position to change the rules. 
But (in Oliver Cromwell's phrase) the 'tortuous and ungodly jumble' of 
English land law was to prevail for centuries.95 A glance at the confused and 
unsatisfactory state of the law (for those using it) in the contemporary U.S. 
on copyright infringement with regard to the fair use of factual works96 
should point a warning to those who believe American law is in harmony 
with the needs of law users. 
The second restriction ought not to need mentioning; I am concerned 
with the development of the legal rules themselves, not with how the legal 
94. See already A. Watson, 'Comparative Law and Legal Change', Cambridge Law 
Journal 37 (1978) 313ff. 
95. For the argument see A. Watson, Society and Legal Change (Edinburgh, 1977) 47ff. 
96. See G. Francione, 'Facing the Nation: The Standards for Copyright, Infringement and 
Fair Use of Factual Works', 134 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 519ff 
(1986). 
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rules operate in society. For reasons at least partly connected with the wider 
society, the same legal rule may operate to different effect in different 
societies. The present paper is written on the premise that actual legal rules, 
as authoritatively set forth, have themselves an impact.97 
97. See already Watson, 'Legal Change', supra note 95 at 1138f. 
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